cours / présentation

2.3. McEliece Assumptions

In this session, we will talk about McEliece assumptions. The security of the McEliece scheme is based on two assumptions as we have already seen: the hardness of decoding a random linear code and the problem of distinguishing a code with a prescribed structure from a random one. In this sequence, w...

Date de création :

05.05.2015

Auteur(s) :

Irene MARQUEZ-CORBELLA, Nicolas SENDRIER, Matthieu FINIASZ

Présentation

Informations pratiques

Langue du document : Anglais
Type : cours / présentation
Niveau : master, doctorat
Durée d'exécution : 3 minutes 15 secondes
Contenu : vidéo
Document : video/mp4
Poids : 96.31 Mo
Droits d'auteur : libre de droits, gratuit
Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs. Ces ressources de cours sont, sauf mention contraire, diffusées sous Licence Creative Commons. L’utilisateur doit mentionner le nom de l’auteur, il peut exploiter l’œuvre sauf dans un contexte commercial et il ne peut apporter de modifications à l’œuvre originale.

Description de la ressource

Résumé

In this session, we will talk about McEliece assumptions. The security of the McEliece scheme is based on two assumptions as we have already seen: the hardness of decoding a random linear code and the problem of distinguishing a code with a prescribed structure from a random one. In this sequence, we will study in detail these two assumptions. The first assumption claims that decoding a random linear code is difficult.  First, notice that the general decoding problem is basically a re-writing of the Syndrome Decoding problem. And both are equivalent to the problem of finding codewords of minimal weight. The Syndrome Decoding in the binary case is state as follows. Given a binary matrix, a syndrome S and a non-negative integer W, the weight. The decision problem faces the following question. There exists an error pattern of weight at most w with syndrome S? while the computational problem is to find such a vector. The decoding problem was proved to be NP-complete in 1978 by Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg in this article. For the q-ary case, see the article of Barg. Take notice that this proof took place at the same time that the McEliece cryptosystem was introduced. Thus, the worst case of the computational problem is known to be difficult in general. Of course, depending on the input, some instances can be solved in polynomial time as we have already seen in the first week. Actually, the instance of Syndrome Decoding involved in breaking code-based systems are in particularly a subclass of Syndrome Decoding where the weight w is bounded by half the minimum distance. This problem is not NP, however it is conjectured to be NP-Hard. But even more in the McEliece cryptosystem, the chosen code is not completely random. Even if the matrix is not distinguishable from a random binary matrix of the same size, the decoding problem uses parameters of those of a Goppa code. This means that the code has length 2^m and the dimension is n mt, where t is the correction capacity.

"Domaine(s)" et indice(s) Dewey

  • Analyse numérique (518)
  • Théorie de l'information (003.54)
  • données dans les systèmes informatiques (005.7)
  • cryptographie (652.8)
  • Mathématiques (510)

Domaine(s)

  • Analyse numérique
  • Analyse numérique appliquée, calcul numérique, mathématiques numériques
  • Programmation : Algorithmique, langages, conception objet, programmes
  • Informatique
  • Informatique
  • Expression orale et écrite
  • Cryptographie
  • Généralités, philosophie, théorie des mathématiques
  • Généralités
  • Outils, méthodes et techniques scientifiques
  • Didactique des mathématiques
  • Histoire des mathématiques
  • Mathématiques et physique

Document(s) annexe(s)

Fiche technique

Identifiant de la fiche : 32829
Identifiant OAI-PMH : oai:canal-u.fr:32829
Schéma de la métadonnée : oai:uved:Cemagref-Marine-Protected-Areas
Entrepôt d'origine : Canal-U

Voir aussi

Canal-U
Canal-U
05.05.2015
Description : This is the last session of the second week. The cryptography community has different options for using public key cryptosystems, among others, they have RSA or DSA. But … McEliece has the same level of performance of the current protocol? eBATS is a competition to identify the most efficient public ...
  • algèbre linéaire
  • chiffrement à clé publique
  • cryptage des données
  • cryptographie
  • McEliece
  • LDPC
  • MDPC
Canal-U
Canal-U
05.05.2015
Description : In this session, we will study the notion of security of public-key scheme. A public-key scheme is one-way if the probability of success of any adversary running in polynomial time is negligible. That is, without the private key, it is computationally impossible to recover the plaintext. For the ...
  • algèbre linéaire
  • chiffrement à clé publique
  • cryptage des données
  • cryptographie
  • McEliece
  • LDPC
  • MDPC