cours / présentation

4.5. Error-Correcting Pairs

We present in this session a general decoding method for linear codes. And we will see it in an example. Let C be a generalized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k associated to the pair (c, d). Then, its dual is again a generalized Reed-Solomon code with the same locator and another column multiplier ...

Date de création :

05.05.2015

Auteur(s) :

Irene MARQUEZ-CORBELLA, Nicolas SENDRIER, Matthieu FINIASZ

Présentation

Informations pratiques

Langue du document : Anglais
Type : cours / présentation
Niveau : master, doctorat
Durée d'exécution : 5 minutes 32 secondes
Contenu : vidéo
Document : video/mp4
Poids : 148.74 Mo
Droits d'auteur : libre de droits, gratuit
Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs. Ces ressources de cours sont, sauf mention contraire, diffusées sous Licence Creative Commons. L’utilisateur doit mentionner le nom de l’auteur, il peut exploiter l’œuvre sauf dans un contexte commercial et il ne peut apporter de modifications à l’œuvre originale.

Description de la ressource

Résumé

We present in this session a general decoding method for linear codes. And we will see it in an example. Let C be a generalized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k associated to the pair (c, d). Then, its dual is again a generalized Reed-Solomon code with the same locator and another column multiplier we will denote by d^ (d dual). Now, consider the codes A and B.  These codes have not been chosen at random. First, notice that the star product of these two codes is the dual of C. Suppose that these codes are known. We will present here an efficient decoding algorithm for C. So, let y be the received word, that is, it is a sum of  a valid codeword and an error vector, and suppose that there have been at most t errors. We define the following kernel that is the set of elements of the code A which are the solutions of this equation. We will see that the kernel associated to the received vector is equivalent to the kernel associated to the error vector. And the reason is very simple. First, notice that the star product of the codes A and B, as we have already said, is the dual of C. Moreover, by definition, the inner product of the code with its dual is 0.  So, the codeword would not affect this system. So, what do we have?  We have that the kernel associated to the received vector is equivalent to the kernel of the received vector. This is because the star product of A and B is the dual code. So, now, we look for a nontrivial element on this kernel, that is, a nontrivial solution of this system, where e is the error vector. Let us define, first, the error locator polynomial associated to the vector c, that is, the root of this polynomial indicate the error position. The evaluation of this element belongs to the code A if, and only if, the dimension of A is greater than t.

"Domaine(s)" et indice(s) Dewey

  • Analyse numérique (518)
  • Théorie de l'information (003.54)
  • données dans les systèmes informatiques (005.7)
  • cryptographie (652.8)
  • Mathématiques (510)

Domaine(s)

  • Analyse numérique
  • Analyse numérique appliquée, calcul numérique, mathématiques numériques
  • Programmation : Algorithmique, langages, conception objet, programmes
  • Informatique
  • Informatique
  • Expression orale et écrite
  • Cryptographie
  • Généralités, philosophie, théorie des mathématiques
  • Généralités
  • Outils, méthodes et techniques scientifiques
  • Didactique des mathématiques
  • Histoire des mathématiques
  • Mathématiques et physique

Document(s) annexe(s)

Fiche technique

Identifiant de la fiche : 32943
Identifiant OAI-PMH : oai:canal-u.fr:32943
Schéma de la métadonnée : oai:uved:Cemagref-Marine-Protected-Areas
Entrepôt d'origine : Canal-U

Voir aussi

Canal-U
Canal-U
05.05.2015
Description : All the results that we have seen this week doesn't mean that code based cryptography is broken. So in this session we will see that Goppa code still resists to all these attacks. So recall that it is assumed that Goppa codes are pseudorandom, that is there exist no efficient distinguisher for ...
  • algèbre linéaire
  • chiffrement à clé publique
  • cryptage des données
  • cryptographie
  • code correcteur
  • algorithmes
  • GRS code
Canal-U
Canal-U
05.05.2015
Description : In this session, we will present an attack against Algebraic Geometry codes (AG codes). Algebraic Geometry codes is determined by a triple. First of all, an algebraic curve of genus g, then a n-tuple of rational points and then a divisor which has disjoint support from the n-tuple P. Then, the A ...
  • algèbre linéaire
  • chiffrement à clé publique
  • cryptage des données
  • cryptographie
  • code correcteur
  • algorithmes
  • GRS code